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1. INTRODUCTION
In the 1990s China has introduced a complete Western-style tax System,
consisting of (corporate and personal) income taxes, VAT, and excises.
This new tax system is part of the transition to 'market socialism'.
Thus far transition has proved an overwhelming success, as the inflow
of foreign capital — now standing at 40 bin dollar a year — shows.
Real GDP growth of 10 per cent or more has become normal, and ap-
parently sustainable. In the near future China's economie attractiveness
will no longer depend on low labour costs, but will have shifted to its
huge consumer demand.
Tax revenues have not been able to keep the pace of growing pros-
perity.2 In 1985, total tax revenue stood at 23.8 per cent of GNP. In
1993, on the eve of a comprehensive tax reform, tax revenues had de-
clined to 13.6 per cent; and in 1996 the figure will probably be around
11.5 per cent. There seems to be a real risk of emerging 'private
1
 This article is an extension of my comments on Dr Y. Zhang's paper during the
conference.
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 Dali Yang, referring to the sum of budgetary and extra-budgetary revenues,
stresses that China's 'extractive power may not be super-strong, but it cannot be charac-
terised as weak or feeble'. But in a market economy, taxes rather than revenues from
state property are the main source of income. See, Dali Yang, Reform and the Restruc-
turing of Central-Local Relations, in, Jia Hao and Lin Zhimin, eds., Changing Central-
Local Relations in China: Reform and State Capacity, Boulder, 1994, pp. 59-98.
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prosperity and public poverty'. To illustrate the point one can think of
public facilities such as roads, public transport, and general education.
Perhaps even more important is the problem of providing basic eco-
nomie security for some ten million unemployed in the cities, and over
a hundred million ageing farmers without any old-age insurance.
Clearly, more tax revenue is needed should the government want to ad-
dress these typical market economy problems.
In a state-owned economy it is both easy and pointless to introducé a
modern tax system. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) can be used as
withholding agents for both income taxes and taxes on goods and serv-
ices. At the same time, taxes are only an alternative way to extract the
'profits' of SOEs, as the government is in fact entitled to these profits.
In official Chinese statistics, it is still customary to make no distinction
between taxes paid by enterprises and (net) profits.
Table L Origin of government revenues, in per cent total revenue according to
ownership and in per cent of GNP
1980 1985 1993
percentage of:
total revenue GNP total revenue GNP total revenue GNP
State-owned 85.4 20.7 73.2 16 65.1 10.6
Collective-owned 14 3.4 '21,8 4.8 18 2.9
Individual 0.6 0.1 4.1 0.9 11.7 1.9
Other 0 0 l 0 . 2 5 . 2 0 . 8
Total 100 24.3 100 21.8 100 16.2
(*) excl. extra-budgetary revenues
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1994
The transition from a state-controlled to a market economy has
three implications for the design and implementation of a tax system.
First, the introduction of explicit taxation has to take account of
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remaining patterns of implicit taxation. One major 'implicit tax' in
China is on savings, äs I will discuss below. Second, a tax System is ef-
fective only to the extent that it is able to tax the private sector. Table l
shows that government revenue in China drawn from the private sector
is still small, though rapidly increasing.
Still, in 1993, more than 80 per cent of government revenues was
generaled by state-owned and collective-owned bodies. Of course, this
simply reflects the fact that China's economy is still preponderantly
state-controlled. On the other hand, it also suggests that the tax admini-
stration has had little experience in dealing with the 'hard to tax' private
sector. Taking account of the fact that government revenue as a per-
centage of GNP has declined (from 24 per cent of GNP in 1980 to 16
per cent in 1993), the general impression is that revenues from the tradi-
tional, state-controlled sector of the economy are declining (and will
continue to do so), while taxation of private prosperity does not yet of-
fer füll compensation.3
The third, and perhaps most important, implication is that in a state-
controlled economy equity goals are dealt with by price and wage con-
trols, while in a market economy they He at the heart of tax policy.4
Thus, fairness in taxation becomes a new and vital requirement — and
it has been accepted as such by the Chinese leadership.5 At the same
time, the major tax reform of 1993 had the explicit goal to 'gradually
increase the percentage of fiscal income in the gross national product
(GNP)'.6 Though not necessarily identical to the effective taxation of
emerging private prosperity, these requirements certainly call for a tax
policy aimed at the private sector.
The decline of tax revenue that China has faced over the last dec-
ade, whatever administrative and economie explanations can be pro-
vided, also indicates that the government cannot find the means to
increase the tax bürden in an equitable way. In this paper I argue that
3
 This is a feature of transition economies in general. See, World Bank, World De-
velopment Report 1996, Washington D.C., 1996, esp. p. 118.
4
 A. Hussain and N. Stern, 'Economie Reforms and Public Finance in China', Public
Finance/Finances Publiques, suppl. 1992 (47), pp. 289-317.
5
 Tsang Shu-Ki and Cheng Yuk-Shing, 'China's Tax Reforms of 1994, Break-
through or Compromise?', Asian Survey, (34) no. 9, September 1994, pp. 769-788.
6
 Quoted from the Decision of the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Commit-
tee, in Tsang and Cheng, p. 770. They provide a more general discussion of the impetus
for tax reform in the political and economie context of 1993-94, as does Dali Yang.
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fairness in taxation is required to achieve an effective tax System and an
increase of tax revenue. In Section 2,1 discuss the equity of tax bürden
distribution in China. In Section 3, I argue that a more effective taxa-
tion of increasing private prosperity will generate growing tax revenue
(in GNP terms). In Sections 4 and 5, two other aspects of fairness in
taxation — equal treatment of taxpayers, and fair administration will be
looked at briefly.
2. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF TAX BURDENS
The current Chinese tax system poses an evident equity problem, as can
be seen from Table 2.
Table 2. Composition of China's tax revenue, 1993
product tax 19.1
VAT 25.2
business tax 22.5
individual income tax 0.7
corporation tax: 17.4
— state owned enterprises 12.8
- collective owned enterprises 2.2
- private, foreign, etc. 2.4
agricultural tax 2.9
tariffs 6
rest 6.2
100
Source: Chinese Ministry of Finance
In fact, Table 2 provides a snapshot of the pre-reform tax system. In
1994, a new VAT was introduced and the product tax was replaced by a
consumption tax (actually, a set of excises), the sum of revenues being
roughly equal to the old VAT and product tax. Thus, the major taxes in
China are the VAT (a tax on commodities, not on services) and the
business tax (a turnover tax in the services sector). Adding tariffs, the
conclusion must be that at least three-quarters of the total tax revenue is
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generaled by indirect taxes (this is, by the way, quite a normal figure for
developing countries). The main income taxes are on corporate income,
and the major part is paid by state-owned and collective-owned enter-
prises. Individual income tax provides for less than one percent of tax
revenue, though this figure may well have increased to two or three per-
cent in 1996.
China's heavy reliance on broad-based VAT, business tax, and con-
sumption taxes will defïnitely cause a regressive distribution of tax bur-
dens because people with low incomes tend to consume them, while
those with high incomes save part of these. In the recent reform of indi-
rect taxes, achieving an equitable distribution of tax burdens has not
been a primary concern.7
In Western countries, direct taxes, especially the personal income
tax, offer compensation by their progressive nature. In the Chinese case
the role of direct taxes is not that clear. Given the brief experience that
China has with direct taxation and the heavy demands that direct taxes
make on the quality of tax administration, the bürden of direct taxes
will probably be highest on those sectors of production that the tax ad-
ministration can readily observe, such as SOEs and collective-owned
agriculture. In fact, rural township enterprises in 1995 earned 23 per
cent of China's GDP and paid one-third of all taxes — which implies
that the tax bürden of this sector exceeded the average of all other sec-
tors by 60 per cent.
On the other hand, there is a considerable implicit tax on personal
savings which will probably hit wealthier people hardest. At first sight,
nearly all direct taxes are paid by state-owned enterprises. SOEs are
still the backbone of the Chinese economy. In conjunction with the ag-
ricultural sector they contain an immense reservoir of hidden unem-
ployment. Because most of these SOEs are in fact incurring heavy and
sustained losses (at least according to Western accounting principles),
they need government subsidies. The most important form of subsidi-
zation is the availability of loans from the state-owned banks at low in-
terest rates. In fact, only recently has the central government forbidden
SOEs to engage in banking activities.
7
 Jinyan Li, 'Value-Added Tax in the People's Republic of China', VAT Monitor, (5)
no. 3, May/June 1994, pp. 130-146. It should be noted however that VAT regressivity
is probably tempered by an exemption for agricultural products (when traded by farm-
ers), while the consumption tax, as a tax on luxuries, may even be slightly progressive.
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The bill is paid by private Investors. The direct loss of interest must
be estimated at Rmb 100 bn8 at least, which is about one-sixth of total
tax revenue and five or six times the individual income tax revenue.
The indirect loss of Investment in poor assets will only materialize in
the next few decades. This implicit tax is probably progressive (in the
sense that wealthier people have more savings) and may well, by its
sheer size, compensate for the lack of progressivity of explicit taxes.
It must be noted that the distinction between direct taxes (on in-
come) and indirect taxes (on commodities and services) is not clear-cut
in China. Originally, the VAT was considered a tax on profits, and this
certainly made sense as long as government set retail prices.9 And, as I
will discuss below, over the last few years the VAT has been develop-
ing into a tax on exporters' profits. More generally, the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect taxes is not decisive as far as tax bürden
distribution is concerned. What matters is that some taxes are suited to
taxing rieh people and increasing prosperity, while others are not. An
effective tax on, e.g., motor car imports may be a better way of taxing
the rieh than a poorly designed personal income tax.
There is another aspect to equitable distribution: the way in which
the tax system affects regions and provinces. In the era of economie re-
form fiscal decentralization has severely limited the central govern-
ment's capacity to redistribute income between regions and provinces.10
The incidence of economie growth has been uneven, and disparities
have increased between the prosperous coastal provinces and the poor
central areas. The 1993 tax sharing system is clearly an improvement,"
8
 Personal savings stand at Rmb 3,555 bn (June 1996), more than half of China's
GDP. Interest rates range from 3 per cent on short-term deposits to 12 per cent on long-
term, which only marginally exceeds the Inflation level of 11 per cent (1996 forecast).
SOEs typically borrow money at 11 per cent. See, The Economist Intelligence Unit,
China Report, 3rd quarter 1996, London, 1996. Given the considerable risk that loans to
SOEs will not (fully) be repaid, the return to savings is evidently below its proper mar-
ket level. For each percentage point that the average return on savings can be deemed
below its market level, the loss to savers is Rmb 35.55 bn.
9
 World Bank, China - Revenue Mobihzation and Tax Policy, Washington D.C.,
1990, offers an economie analysis of China's indirect tax policy in the 1980s.
'" Christine P.W. Wong, 'Central-Local Relations in an Era of Fiscal Decline: the
Paradox of Fiscal Decentralization in Post-Mao China', The China Quarterly, 1992, pp.
691-715.
11
 See, Zhang's contribution to this volume, and Tsang and Cheng. The failures of
previous sharing arrangements have also been discussed by, mter alia, the World Bank
1990 report and Mario I. Blejer, 'China: Prolonged Reforms and the Weakening of Fis-
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but it assigned the more buoyant taxes to the provincial and local gov-
ernments. Typically, taxes in China are shared between levels of gov-
ernment. This goes for corporate income taxes, where tax bases are
divided functionally (e.g., each level of government is entitled to tax
those SOEs that are its property, but central government taxes all rail-
ways, banks, and steel production). It also holds for VAT, where
central government takes 75 per cent of the revenue. The most impor-
tant exceptions to these sharing arrangements are import duties and
consumption tax (i.e., excises) where central government gets all the
revenue, and the business tax and the personal income tax that flow to
local governments. It seems that mis distribution of taxing powers is to
the advantage of local governments. The business tax is levied on all
services as an alternative to VAT (that relates to cornmodities only).
With China's economie activities still heavily relying on agriculture and
industry, a secular increase in the share of services in GDP may be ex-
pected. Local governments will seize the additional tax revenue. Of
course, central government may strike back by extending the scope of
VAT at the expense of the business tax.'2 Compared to business tax
revenue, personal income tax revenue is quite modest at the moment.
But long-run prospects are bright, as the central government has be-
come well aware. As long as the central government has no budgetary
interest in increasing personal income tax revenues, it has no clear in-
centive to improve the quality and scope of the tax. The effective con-
tent of the law (what is taxed, and in what way) will then be decided at
the local level. Such a development may prove harmful to tax perform-
ance, especially where sources of income between local jurisdictions
are potentially mobile. From an equity point of view, a personal
cal Control', in V. Tanzi, ed., Transition to Market, Studies in Fiscal Reform, IMF
Washington D.C., 1993.
12
 For small entrepreneurs, it may be attractive to be taxed under VAT rather than
business tax. This will depend on both their branch of activity (which determines their
business tax rate) and their treatment under VAT. As a rule, small enterprises under
VAT are taxed at a low rate (6 per cent instead of 13 per cent or 17 per cent) without a
claim on refund of input VAT. However, with reasonable bookkeeping a small entrepre-
neur may apply for normal VAT treatment. Thus, he will get a VAT refund on inputs
that he would not be entitled to under the business tax. In principle, it would be interest-
ing for the central government to seize the business tax base by the liberal admission of
the self-employed to the normal VAT system. However, over the last few years the Chi-
nese VAT has suffered from considerable problems in running the refund system (sub-
mitting 'fake invoices' can even lead to the death sentence).
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income tax levied by the central government would be an attractive in-
strument for fiscal equalization between regions and provinces.
Of course, one can argue, to quote Musgrave,13 that in a developing
economy the focus must be on economie growth, savings and Invest-
ment, and conclude that 'fair distribution is a luxury that poor countries
cannot afford'. On the other hand, Musgrave contends, fairness is obvi-
ously important when average income is low, and fairness is required to
develop public support for the tax system.
Given the Chinese government's stated goal of reducing income
inequality by means of taxation, there is clear reason for concern. It
will be virtually impossible to increase VAT rates, because this tax
tends to enlarge income inequality. Moreover, the statistical data avail-
able suggest that income inequality in China is fairly moderate yet in-
creasing.14 Given the fact that the Chinese government cannot control
incomes earned in the private sector, achieving fairness in taxation is
the main instrument by which to narrow the gap between the rieh and
the poor. Apparently personal income tax is being assigned the major
role. The Decision of the Fifth Plenum of the Fourteenth Central Com-
mittee (September 1995),'5 when addressing the issue of'narrowing too
big gaps in social distribution by means of taxation', only specifïes
measures to improve the collection and administration of the personal
income tax.
3. STATE REVENUES AND TAX POLICY
The budgetary success of the introduction of a modern tax system in
China seems to have been dubious so far. Returning to Table l, one can
observe that an increasing portion of tax revenue is generated in the
market sector. Because the data in Table l refer to total government
revenue (including for example profits from SOEs) the contribution of
the private sector to tax revenue may well be over 20 per cent in 1993,
which is roughly in line with the private sector's contribution to GDP.
Over the same period, industry lost its role as the main source of
13
 Richard Musgrave, 'Tax Reform in Developing Countries', in D. Newbery, N.
Stern, The Theory of Taxation for Developing Countries, Oxford 1987, pp. 242-263.
14
 In 1990, the top 10 per cent in China received 24.6 per cent of total personal in-
come, two years later they received 26.8 per cent. See, the World Bank's World Devel-
opment Report, 1993 and 1996. Washington D.C., 1993, 1996.
13
 Quoted from the excerpt published in China Daily, October 5th, 1995.
Chinese Tax Policy: the Problem ofFairness 99
government revenue (its share declining from 83 per cent to 38 per cent,
while commerce increased its share from 2 per cent to 26 per cent).
Moreover, the share of taxes in total revenue increased from 53 per cent
to 84 per cent, and revenues from enterprises declined from 40 per cent
to l per cent of total revenue. All these data suggest that China's tax
system has been able to cope with a rapidly changing economie envi-
ronment. On the other hand since the mid-1980s, total tax revenue is
declining in GNP terms, and the 1993 tax reform has brought no im-
provement to date.
As Table 3 shows, tax revenue16 is still lagging behind GNP
growth.17 The main explanation is China's heavy dependence on VAT.
In fact, personal income tax does quite well, and taxes on business (cor-
poration income taxes and business tax) seem to perform reasonably.
Table 3. Increase in GNP and in industrial & commercial taxes, 1993-1996
1993-1994 1994-1995 1995-1996(*)
GNP 38.4 30 19.2
PIT 54.9 80.8
CT&VAT 25.1 13.9 19.1
BT & CITs 22.7 n. a.
total 25.4 18.3 22.4
(*) January-June
Sources: Economist Intelligence Unit, State Tax Bureau press releases
Generally, heavy reliance on indirect taxes produces a negative 'fiscal
dividend'. This means that the share of taxes in GDP has a natural ten-
dency to decline as GDP increases. As people become more
16
 Taxes referred to are the so-called industrial and commercial taxes, which generate
about 85 per cent of total tax revenue, the remainder consisting of, mter alia, stamp
duty, agricultural tax.
17
 The year 1996 may prove the first exception, although the January-September in-
crease of tax revenue is reported to be slightly lower than GNP growth. But the in-
creased reduction of VAT refund on export from January l, 1996 onward may well
account for 5 per cent increase of total tax revenue.
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prosperous, they can save more money. The share of consumption in
GDP declines, and so does the revenue of taxes levied on consumption.
In contrast, countries with a heavy reliance on (progressive) income
taxes will enjoy a positive fiscal dividend: as people get to earn more,
their tax payments will steeply increase. Selected taxes on luxury com-
modities can also contribute to fiscal dividend.
This leads to a clear cut policy conclusion. Countries with a nega-
tive fiscal dividend, such as China, cannot ensure increasing tax reve-
nues (in GNP terms) without constantly increasing tax rates and
introducing new taxes. On the other hand, countries with a positive fis-
cal dividend, such as most Western countries, can keep their tax reve-
nue intact and still reduce tax rates. From this perspective, there is a
clear relationship between accomplishing fairness in taxation, budget-
ary revenues, and tax policy. To achieve a tax system that generates in-
creasing revenue, it is necessary that China's new prosperity be taxed
effectively.
Can this be achieved by personal income taxation? Increasing in-
come inequality suggests that the high-incjme individuals' ability to
pay taxes is increasing as well, and probably at considerable speed. As
mentioned earlier, the Chinese leadership expects to reduce income ine-
quality by means of the personal income tax. And though its revenue is
low (some 0.3 per cent of GDP), it has been rapidly increasing over the
last few years. The Chinese government seems to consider this a sig-
nificant success, presuming that the tax is being paid by an increasing
number of high-income earners from the market sector, but this is
doubtful. Since 1994, the personal income tax rate structure has not
been adjusted for inflation. This causes ä considerable, inflation-driven
fiscal dividend in income tax — people who were in the personal in-
come tax in 1994 will pay far more in 1996 even if their taxable in-
comes just kept up with inflation. Table 4 provides a numerical
example for four persons who respectively had wage incomes of 850,
1,000, 1,200, and 2,000 Yuan a month at the beginning of 1994 and
whose wage increase since has been equal to consumer price increases
over 1994 and 1995.
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Table 4. Fiscal dividend in the Chinese Individual Income Tax: an Illustra-
tion
consumer price Inflation
1994
24.2
1995
16.9
1996
wage income tax payment (Yuan per month)
850 2.5
1,000 0
1,200 20
2,000 95
Source: author's own calculations
12.79 (+412%) 21.71 (+70%)
22.10 (+121 %) 40.19 (+82%)
44.04 (+120%) 69.23 (+57%)
143.40 (+ 51%) 190.57 (+33%)
Non-adjustment of income tax brackets for Inflation can well ex-
plain the actual increase of tax revenue, which was 55 per cent in 1994
and 81 per cent in 1995. In other words: the strong increase in personal
income tax revenue does not, in itself, justify the conclusion that an in-
creasing number of people is being taxed. And with decreasing Infla-
tion, this fiscal dividend will soon dwindle.
This performance should be considered in the proper perspective of
a developing country. Most developing countries do have some kind of
personal income tax — often with rather high rates, even — but these
generate little revenue. They are paid primarily by civil servants, the
employees of state enterprises, and foreign corporations. Workers in
agriculture and small firms, and the self-employed are not effectively
being taxed.'8 In addition, income thresholds are generally high. As a
result, high top rates combine with low revenue. The Chinese personal
income tax is certainly no exception to this general Impression of weak
performance.19 Some improvement may be possible. Under the
18
 R. Burgess and N. Stern, 'Taxation and Development', in Journal of Economie Lit-
erature (31), June 1993, pp. 762-830.
19
 W. Easterly and S. Rebelo, 'Marginal Income Tax Rates and Economie Growth in
Developing Countries', European Economie Review, 37 (1993) 2-2, pp. 409-417, pro-
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existing assignment of taxing powers, lower levels of government are
entitled to its revenue. It is very attractive for local governments to de-
vote their efforts to personal income tax, because they do not have to
share the revenue. Presuming that local governments are in a better po-
sition to acquire information on personal incomes, it may be wise to
leave it that way for some years to come. The current structure of tax
rates may be revised for that purpose. The first rate is now only 5 per
cent, which means that local governments have little incentive to look
for new taxpayers whose income has just exceeded the basic exemption.
A first tax rate of, say, 15 per cent might well double or triple personal
income tax revenue.
But generally, the personal income tax cannot solve the Chinese
government's budgetary problems. To do so, it would have to trans-
form the tax from a 'class tax' into a 'mass tax'. The coverage of the
tax should be extended to include the average worker level (which
means that the basic exemption should be halved). The technique — a
wage withholding tax — is quite feasible in China, because most work-
ers are employed in state-owned enterprises.20 But this is exactly what
makes such a tax pointless, as long as the state is prepared to back up
SOEs losses.
The basic issue of how to tax increasing private prosperity may tend
to be obscured rather than clarified by looking at the feasibility of in-
come taxes. It is quite easy to predict how Chinese people will use their
increasing wealth in the next decade. First, they will use part of it to in-
crease their savings (keeping in mind that pension provisions are lack-
ing, or unreliable should a SOE be involved). And secondly, they will
buy TV and PC sets, videos, all kinds of electrical equipment, and mo-
tor cars.
Taxation of savings does not seem to be feasible now or in the near
future. As noted above, savings are in fact taxed implicitly because of
the state monopoly in the domestic savings market. What remains then
is the taxation of 'conspicuous consumption'. The purchase of
vide data on personal income tax performance in (among other countries) India, Indone-
sia, and Pakistan. These countries all achieve a personal income tax revenue of about l
per cent of GDP, as compared to 0.3 per cent in China. Part of the explanation may be
that these countries' tax rates exceed China's. But at least, there is no indication that
China is more successful in running a personal income tax than other comparable
countries.
20
 Hussain and Stern.
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consumer durables and cars is only just beginning; and should China's
economie growth proceed at the current pace, an enormous increase of
these markets can be expected. In other words, increasing prosperity
can be taxed by indirect taxes on durables, cars, and fuel.
Of course, China does have a System of excises ('consumption tax')
focused primarily on luxuries. Taxable items include automobiles, fuel,
cosmetics, alcohol, and tobacco. But tax rates are generally low (start-
ing with 3 per cent for non-luxury cars, and a maximum of 45 per cent
for top-quality cigarettes; fuel tax rates amount to $0.02 for petrol and
$0.01 for diesel). There is clear scope for rate increases here. On the
other hand, we (again) find problems of tax co-ordination. The tax bür-
den on the purchase of a new car seems to be close to 100 per cent
(quite comparable to European countries), due partly to local govern-
ments levies. Moreover, it should be noted that limited administrative
capacity implies low (or at least not too high) tax rates. It is reported
that half of China's (admittedly low) car imports from Japan is smug-
gled. Yet, the basic point remains that indirect taxes on specific com-
modities may do more to achieve a fair distribution of tax burdens than
personal income tax äs it functions now.
4. NON-DISCRIMINATION OF TAXPAYERS
Non-discrimination or equal taxpayer treatment has strong roots in po-
litical theory. There are two points involved. First, the requirement of
non-discrimination forces government not to grant any tax privileges.
Taxpayers can be made to pay different amounts of tax only to the ex-
tent that they themselves differ in circumstances and characteristics.
There is an important political side to non-discrimination. As Bucha-
nan21 has pointed out, general and uniform taxation offers few opportu-
nities for lobbyism and clientelism. Conversely, a System containing
many special provisions and exceptions creates ample scope for nego-
tiations between politicians, tax administration, and taxpayers. Sec-
ondly, non-discrimination can also be considered a restriction on
governments' ability to use tax incentives (and penalties) for socio-
economic purposes.
21
 J. Buchanan, 'The Political Efficiency of General Taxation', National Tax Journal,
XLVI, no. 4 (1993), pp. 401-410.
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China's recent tax reforms have explicitly been aimed at improving
equal treatment.22 However, it is difficult to say what 'equal treatment'
means in a transition economy. I will illustrate this point with two
examples.
First, the new personal income tax. China has a schedular personal
income tax. Taxation of wage income is progressive with a threshold of
800 Yuan per month (more than twice the average income in urban ar-
eas) and nine rates up to 45 per cent. Business income faces a top rate
of 35 per cent, several other components of income are taxed at a flat
rate. Interest received from a state bank is tax exempt.
This schedular tax reflects both administrative and economie prob-
lems in applying income taxation. Non-wage income is hard-to-tax,
which may justify lower rates. And state banks have a monopoly posi-
tion on the savings market, while paying below-Inflation interest. This
may well justify tax exemption. It should be noted that reportedly a
large amount of savings flows out of China illegally, mainly to Hong
Kong and Taiwan. This indicates that domestic savings cannot be in-
vested in a reasonable way, and have to escape the country, probably to
return disguised as foreign investment. Thus, given the large implicit
tax on savings, it is not feasible to tax personal income uniformly in-
come irrespective of its source.
The second case to be discussed is corporate income taxation, where
domestic Chinese Investors may face a tax bürden far in excess of that
of foreign investors'. Despite important simplifications in corporate in-
come taxation, China still has a separate corporate income tax for prof-
its on foreign-owned investment. In principle, both taxes use the same
tax rate of 33 per cent (including a 3 per cent local surcharge). How-
ever, in the Special Economie Zones (SEZs), where more than 80 per
cent of foreign investment is located, the Standard rate is 15 per cent.
For enterprises qualifying as 'export-oriented' the rate is normally 10
per cent, and a refund up to 100 per cent is available when profits are
reinvested in the establishment or expansion of an export-oriented or
technologically advanced enterprise.23 Moreover, time and again the
central government has forbidden local tax authorities to apply their
own exemptions and rate reductions.
22
 Zhang, in this volume, discusses the unification of income taxes from this
perspective.
23
 International Bureau of Fiscal Documentation, Taxation and Investment in the
People's Republic of China.
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As a result, China's System of corporate income taxation discrimi-
nates heavily between domestic and foreign enterprises. This can easily
be seen from corporate tax revenues (Table 2). While SOEs are respon-
sible for a small and declining part of total corporate profits (for 1996
no more than l per cent) they pay the lion's share of corporate taxes.
Corporate tax revenue from foreign-owned (and private) enterprises
equalled no more than 0.3 per cent of GDP in 1993.
There are three problems involved. One is a matter of policy
choice. Low corporate taxation of foreign investment is a deliberate
strategy, meant to attract foreign investment and, probably, to be abol-
ished äs soon äs foreign investment has gained impetus. And indeed,
Chinese tax policy is now explicitly facing the question of how and
when to increase the corporate tax bürden on foreign-owned invest-
ment. On the other hand, it should be noted that the overall tax bürden
on foreign Investors is by no means low. It is quite clear that many for-
eign enterprises in China incur high costs in paying all kind of (local)
contributions, levies, and fees. According to China's Minister of For-
eign Trade the tax payments of foreign-funded enterprises account for
10 per cent of China's total tax revenue. This is due mainly to limited
VAT refunding at export. In principle, the Chinese VAT is destination-
based: VAT paid on production inputs is deductible upon export. In
practice, and mainly for budgetary reasons, this rebate has been almost
halved over the last few years. The VAT thus works out äs an export
tax, and on the presumption that exporters face a competitive world
market this constitutes a tax on exporters' profits. Its revenue by far ex-
ceeds the corporate tax revenue on foreign-owned enterprises.24
A second, and perhaps related, problem is the distribution of taxing
powers. Basically, lower levels of government have too large a role in
the taxation of corporate profits. Any local government that wants to
compete with the SEZs has to convince foreign investors that the statu-
tory tax rate of 33 per cent will not be applied fully (which may be
achieved by tax rebates, lax tax enforcement, postponed tax payment
and the like). Thus, it will be difficult for China to get more corporate
tax revenue out of foreign investment without transferring the power to
tax to the central level. Given this state of affairs, taxing foreign
24
 This can be loosely estimated at Rmb 60 to 70 bn in 1996, which is equal to 10 per
cent of China's total tax revenue and l per cent of GDP. In Beijing — a host to many
foreign corporations, of course — more than half of local tax revenue stems from for-
eign enterprises.
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enterprises by limiting VAT refunds on exports may be the best option
available to the central government.
The third problem is tax administration. SOEs may have reasons to
resort to tax evasion, but their average size is conducive to a reasonable
level of tax auditing. Foreign and private-owned enterprises, because of
their smaller average size, can escape profits taxation more easily.25
This administrative consideration strengthens the case for limited VAT
refunding. After all, private enterprises have a clear incentive to report
the size and value of their exports, even with limited VAT refunding.
The practical conclusion, however, is that the Chinese VAT is develop-
ing into an (origin-based) sales tax.
Still, what remains is that domestic enterprises face far higher cor-
porate taxes. The point is of course that most of these enterprises are
SOEs and enjoy large (implicit) subsidies, especially soft loans. In a
sense, this allows them to pay corporate taxes. Taxation of SOEs nowa-
days in China serves the particular function of siphoning money from
the domestic savings market to the treasury. It does not seem wise to
accord SOEs the favourable corporate tax treatment that foreign enter-
prises receive, unless subsidies to SOEs are stopped (and the return to
personal savings taxed at high explicit rates to pay for unemployment
benefits to redundant SOE-workers). And on the other hand, the hesita-
tion of the Chinese leadership to put an end to preferential tax treatment
for foreign enterprises is quite sensible. In other words, in the presence
of important implicit taxes and subsidies, the requirement of equal
treatment of taxpayers cannot be considered in isolation.26
A related general question is to what extent the government should
be allowed to provide economie incentives and disincentives through
the tax system. In Western countries, there is no clear and general an-
swer to this question. On the one hand, taxation is regarded as an
25
 See, Dali Yang at p. 70. Blejer States the Chinese government has been trying to
tax private sector incomes and that 'receipts from personal income taxes, as well as re-
ceipts from foreign-related enterprises [i.e., through corporate income taxation, HV] ...
have increased in importance after 1987'. The 1993 data show that these increases must
have been very modest.
26
 Jinyan Li, 'Domestic Enterprise Income Tax', in, Bulletin IBFD, February 1995,
pp. 81—94 argues that a higher tax rate on domestic enterprises is no longer justified as
'all these enterprises compete openly on the market'. SOEs, however, can rely on the
state to cover their losses. In the end, privately funded domestic enterprises pay the bill
under the current system: they cannot obtain tax preferences available for foreign invest-
ment yet have to compete with foreign enterprises.
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Intervention in (if not a violation of) private property rights. On the
other hand, it is acknowledged that taxation is a part of the govern-
ment's socio-economic policies.
In China, the issue is perhaps even more troubled for two reasons.
First, the relation between politics and market sector (and the scope for
political interventions in market decisions) is unclear. Secondly, taxes
have only recently been introduced and have no traditional roots in
China. As a consequence, it seems that Chinese government has few (if
any) inhibitions about using large-scale tax incentives for promoting in-
vestment and economie growth, or to direct such incentives to specific
zones and economie activities.
5. FAIR TAX ADMINISTRATION
Fairness in taxation does not relate only to the distribution of the tax
bürden; it also requires that tax liabilities be assessed according to ac-
ceptable rules. Modern tax theory is based mainly on the 'social con-
tract' philosophy: governments' power to tax depends on their citizens'
consent. Thus, government is only entitled to lay its hand on private
property when it uses general, promulgated rules that apply equally to
all — that is to say, tax laws. Only by so doing can governments make
the crucial step from state-organized looting to taxation (though proba-
bly no government succeeds in convincing every citizen that it has in-
deed taken that step). This requires transparent tax law, fair and
capable tax administration, a reliable and accessible system of judicial
review. Though it would be difficult to submit empirical proof, it
seems clear that people are more willing to pay taxes when they feel
that the same rules are applied to all, and that taxpayers enjoy legal
rights to be enforced through independent courts. Such requirements
pose evident problems in developing countries and China is no
exception.
There are reasons to expect special problems in China. One is the
extremely rapid pace of tax reform over the last few years — practically
all taxes plus the tax administration have been touched. Over the last
few years, the tax administration has been split up into local and state
tax bureaus, the latter reporting to national government. These new bu-
reaus had to implement new corporate and personal income taxes, a
new VAT refund system and new excises. In combination with the ex-
perimental nature of tax law (often embodied in temporary State
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Council regulations rather than formal law), many Chinese taxpayers
must be confused as to what their tax obligations now are. In such a cli-
mate, tax officials can easily engage in corruption and extortion. Re-
cently, one of China's vice-premiers publicly warned local officials to
refrain from collecting illegal (i.e., non-existing) fees from peasants,
and the State Council has decided that fees should not exceed 5 per cent
of farmers' net income. And local tax administrations, facing difficul-
ties in VAT enforcement, are reported to use their own ways of assess-
ing tax liabilities (such as imposing fixed-amount payments). Though
the speed of reform may be understandable in political terms,?7 it seems
that both tax administration and taxpayers could use some rest and
some simplification.
At first sight, Chinese tax law does look very simple. For example,
the income tax is a very concise piece of law (14 clauses in about four
pages), compared to its Western equivalents. But this simplicity im-
plies that many regulations are required that clarify concepts and proce-
dures. These regulations are partly concluded by loca! governments
and not always publicized. Moreover, in many cases the tax admini-
stration is exclusively authorized to interpret tax regulations. As a re-
sult, conflicts between taxpayers and tax administration are settled by
administrative review. There is no tradition of judicial appeal.28 Thus,
the legal position of taxpayers is generally weak, and the review system
seems to lack a built-in mechanism to provide for uniform interpreta-
tion of national tax laws and regulations.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have discussed the relevance offairness in taxation as a
requirement to tax policy in China.
The Chinese leadership wants to use the tax system to reduce grow-
ing income inequality and to increase government revenue. It attaches
great value to non-discrimination — more precisely, to the merger of
hitherto separated taxes. It also emphasizes that taxes should be levied
according to law.
In this paper I have argued that personal income tax in China is not
suited to achieving a meaningful shift of the tax bürden to high-income
27
 See, Tsang and Cheng.
28
 IBFD, Taxation and Investment in the PRC, offers a short description and com-
ment on the Chinese review system.
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taxpayers. Instead, the problem of equitable distribution should be ad-
dressed within the System of indirect taxes, especially VAT and con-
sumption tax. There are several reasons not to expect a major role for
personal income taxation in the near future. The most general argument
is that developing countries as a rule do not succeed in making the per-
sonal income tax a significant source of revenue. In the Chinese case,
additional considerations are (1) the presence of a heavy implicit tax on
savings which, in a fairly arbitrary way, functions like a progressive
capital income tax and (2) the fact that most workers are in SOEs,
which implies that a wage withholding tax would increase the SOE's
demand for government subsidies and loans.
In its search for increasing revenue, the Chinese government faces
serious restrictions. To increase the taxes paid by SOEs is useless. The
return on foreign investment is now being taxed quite considerably to
the extent that profits are earned on exports; somewhat surprisingly
(from a Western point of view) the instrument is not corporate income
tax but VAT. It seems that VAT and excises are the main potential
sources for additional revenue. In other words, the role of direct (in-
come) taxes in China is marginal. And it seems that there is little scope
for improvement as long as economie reform stops short of SOE and
banking reform.
For the same reasons, 'non-discrimination' is not a very useful con-
cept in China's tax policy, though clearly a consideration in current tax
policy. It is hard to say what non-discrimination means in a transition
economy. The favourable tax treatment of one sector can be undone by
implicit taxes, and on the other hand heavy taxation and subsidization
may occur jointly. One sector that may be discriminated against in a
real sense is privately-funded domestic enterprises. These do not enjoy
the preferential corporate tax treatment awarded to foreign-funded en-
terprises, but they do suffer from limited VAT refunding at export.
The criterion of fair administration requires special attention be-
cause of the breath-taking speed of tax reform. Also considering lim-
ited administrative resources, some tax simplification may be needed.
A natural candidate would be the VAT, that seems to suffer large ad-
ministrative problems (especially relating to the refund of input VAT).
A retail sales tax might well prove far easier to handle and generate the
same tax revenue. The system of excises could be used as the most fea-
sible way to improve both equity and revenues.
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It should be noted though that the distribution of taxing powers over
levels of government seems to dominate all other issues in tax policy.
Perhaps central government has regained the initiative over the last few
years, but a reversion of fiscal decentralization seems improbable. In
such circumstances, the distribution of tax burdens may well become
wholly uncoordinate and very uneven. Those tax bases that cannot es-
cape or respond to high levels of taxation will be taxed by every level of
government; tax bases that are very mobile between jurisdictions will
be taxed by none. Much of this can already be observed in present-day
China.
Thus, the future of China's tax system depends both on further pro-
gress towards a market economy and on the distribution of fiscal pow-
ers over the levels of government.
